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Big data, small law: how gaps in regulation are affecting political campaigning methods 
and the need for fundamental reform  
Bethany Shiner* 
Technological developments, involving big data and data analytics, have enabled political parties and 
campaign groups to believe that they know or can accurately predict the political leanings of individual 
voters. Based on these developments, and coupled with psychological research deepening our 
understanding of decision making, campaign techniques involving individualised and targeted social 
media political advertisements have emerged. While research is not able to measure what impact, if any, 
these advertisements have there is a concern regarding the capacity of these techniques to influence in 
a non-transparent way by deceptively using personal data. In addition to protecting personal data, the 
law assumes that the electorate must maintain a ‘free mind’ and there must be a level playing field 
between political opponents. The current statutory framework is marked by an overlapping application 
of the Data Protection Act 2018, replacing the 1998 Act; the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000; the Representation of the People Act 1983; and, the Communications Act 2005. 
As the evidence published in relation to several inquiries into these issues indicates, the gaps in the way 
this area is regulated means the law cannot adequately deal with the issues posed by the collection and 
use of personal data for the design and deployment of targeted social media political campaign 
advertisements. Further, the dependence upon these techniques by political parties and campaign 
groups mean that the necessary comprehensive reforms may never be made.  
Introduction 
In several related ways, the law attempts to regulate the electoral process and political 
campaigning to ensure fairness.1 Apart from offences such as treating,2  personation,3 and 
those dealing with direct interference with voting,4 electoral law regulates the electoral 
process by applying limits on the amount of money that can be spent during a referendum 
and election campaign.5 The laws governing elections and political advertising assume that 
the electorate must maintain a ‘free mind’ and bans political advertisements from television 
and radio broadcasting (but not social media).6 The law provides other measures such as 
preventing over-zealous campaigners from speed-dialling the electorate with automated 
messages without permission to do so.7 Data protection laws aim to maintain privacy for 
individuals online protecting personal data and, more strictly, sensitive personal data which 
includes political opinions. In combination, these laws are meant to establish limits, 
boundaries and protections for the democratic process. However, new campaigning 
techniques reveal deficiencies in the law's aim of regulating and limiting the conduct of 
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1 The discussion in this paper applies to elections and referendums. Although, there are differences between the 
two processes, they both use the same basic administrative and political structures and are based on the same 
political concept of informed democratic consent.  
2 Erlam & Ors v Rahman & Anor [2015] EWHC 1215 (QB) 
3 Representation of the People Act 1983, s 60 
4 Such as Representation of the People Act 1983, ss 65(1) and 66(3)  
5 Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act 2000 ss. 108-110; K.D. Ewing, “Transparency, accountability 
and equality: the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000” (2001) PL 542-570  
6 Communications Act 2003 s. 321 
7 Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, reg. 19; Scottish National Party v The Information 
Commissioner [2006] EA/2005/0021  
  
political parties, campaign groups, candidates and elected representatives during election and 
referendum campaigns. 
Micro-targeting is generally perceived as a normalised8 marketing and campaign strategy that 
uses data and demographics to create audience segments. The data includes personal 
information, actual behaviour and textual information about social interactions, 
conversations, reading and commenting history. This data is processed and analysed to 
determine political leanings and personal attributes with such precision that even information 
not explicitly given can be established.9 These insight are used to identify which types of 
political campaign advertisements should be sent to which individuals over social media. 
Personality traits can be measured to inform tailored emotionalised political advertisements 
often described as psychographics.10 However, the individual does not know they have been 
profiled based on their data or that they have been selected for targeting.11 Micro-targeted 
advertisements are difficult to detect because by using dark advertisements only the sender, 
the social media platform and the receiver know what has been sent to whom.12 The supposed 
aim of this practice is to influence and change voting behaviour for the benefit of the political 
party or group deploying these techniques.13  
This paper will use these new campaign techniques to argue that the existing statutory regime, 
particularly regarding data protection and online direct marketing techniques,14 cannot 
adequately and coherently respond to the issues that these methods raise.15 To examine the 
potential detrimental effect of micro-targeting and other related online communication 
techniques this paper refers to legal, scientific and technological scholarship. It illustrates how 
the regulatory framework does not fulfil its purpose of maintaining fair, clean and free 
elections. This is highly problematic, particularly when trust in the democratic process is low 
and when the integrity of democracy as a system of governance is globally undermined and 
challenged. Finally, it critiques recent proposals for reform that offer piecemeal updates to the 
existing framework. 
Micro-targeting as a form of political communication 
                                                          
8 The Electoral Commission, “Political Finance Regulation and Digital Campaigning: A Public Perspective: GfK 
UK report for qualitative research findings” (April 24, 2018) electoralcommission.org.uk 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/244540/Electoral-Commission-political-
finance-regulation-and-digital-campaigning-a-public-perspective.pdf [Accessed July 2, 2018] 
9 Z. Tufekci, “Engineering the public: Big data, surveillance, and computational politics” (July 2014) First 
Monday, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4901/4097 [Accessed July 24, 2018] 
10 Psychographics have been used in US elections but whether psychographics were used during the UK-EU 
referendum remains unestablished due to mixed accounts and documents recording conflicting evidence. See 
House of Commons. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim 
Report Session 2017–19 (The Stationery Office, 2018) HC Paper No. 363 (Session 2017-19)  
11 M. Schroepfer, “An update on our plans to restrict data access on Facebook” (April 4, 2018) Facebook 
Newsroom https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/restricting-data-access/ [Accessed 24 July 2018] 
12 Dark advertisements allow page owners to show non-public paid posts to selected users and as such are 
untraceable and can enable foreign advertisements on domestic matters. 
13 D. Tambini, S. Labo, E. Goodman and M. Moore, “The new political campaigning” London School of 
Economics and Political Science (March 2017) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/71945/ [Accessed July 24, 2018] 
14 Flaws in the regulation of campaign spending pose a critical weakness in the legal framework but there is not 
enough scope to tackle this here. 
15 This article does not turn on any specific allegation by any specific party or group but accepts, based on publicly 
available evidence cited throughout this paper, that in the whole these techniques exist and have been used on the 
electorate in the UK and globally.  
  
Big data is “high velocity, complex and variable” data and as such requires sophisticated 
technologies to capture, store, distribute, manage, and analyse the information.16 The data set 
is too enormous to be efficiently processed manually by humans, so algorithms analyse the 
information to reveal trends, patterns and correlations.17 It is this process that enables 
algorithms to make predictions or gain insights that are not otherwise made explicit.18  Big 
data can turn unseen correlations into “objects of scientific inquiry and manipulation.”19 As 
such, techno-sociologists urge that big data needs to be regarded as a political process 
engaging issues of transparency, power and surveillance – particularly because it is a tool 
possessing the capacity to “engineer consent”.20 However, “predicting attributes is much 
easier than persuading people” and the idea that changing someone's opinion merely requires 
evaluating traits like openness or political attitude is not proven.21 
Data from credit reference agencies, insurance companies or comparison websites, for 
example, can be bought legally from data analytics firms and data brokers.22 The electoral 
register can be sold, in prescribed circumstances, to credit reference agencies23 and 
commercial interests can buy an edited version of the register excluding those who object to 
their details being sold to third parties.24 Tracking cookies25 follow consumers online 
capturing individuals’ digital movements for analysis26 which can be broadly described as 
political profiling. This falls within the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) new 
                                                          
16 TechAmerica Foundation, “Demystifying Big Data: A Practical Guide to Transforming the Business of 
Government” (2012) https://bigdatawg.nist.gov/_uploadfiles/M0068_v1_3903747095.pdf [Accessed 24 July 
2018] 
17 A. Gandomi and M. Haidar, “Beyond the hype: Big data concepts, methods, and analytics” (2015) IJIM 35(2) 
137-144 
18 See fn. 17. This process of analysis is referred to as ‘reality mining' which is the collection and analysis of 
machine-sensed environmental data relating to human social behaviour, with the goal of identifying predictable 
patterns of behaviour.  
19 See fn. 9  
20 E. Bernays, “The Engineering of Consent” (1947) The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 250(1) 113-120 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/000271624725000116 [Accessed  
August 13 2017] 
21 A. Rogers, “The Cambridge Analytica data apocalypse was predicted in 2007” (March 25, 2018) Wired 
https://www.wired.com/story/the-cambridge-analytica-data-apocalypse-was-predicted-in-2007/ [Accessed July 
31, 2018]  
22 ICO Investigation update report confirms that it is looking at credit reference agencies in respect of the services 
they  promote to political parties and campaigns see ICO Investigation into the use of data analytics 
in political campaigns (June 21, 2018) https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259371/investigation-into-
data-analytics-for-political-purposes-update.pdf [Accessed July 26, 2018] 
23 Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001 reg. 114; R (on the application of 
Robertson) v Secretary of State [2003] EWHC 1760 (Admin) 
24 Following Robertson v Wakefield Metropolitan Council [2001] [2001] EWHC Admin 915, [2002] QB 1052, 
the Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001 were amended by the Representation of 
the People (England and Wales) (Amendment) 2002 to introduce an edited register for anyone opposed to their 
details being sold onto a third parties 
25 Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, reg. 6 
26 D. Albright “How Your Data on Facebook Is Collected and Used to Win Elections” (March  22, 2018) 
MakeUseOf, https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/facebook-data-influence-elections/ [Accessed July 26, 2018]; J. 
Bartlett “Big Data is watching you – and it wants your vote” (March 24, 2018) The Spectator 
https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/03/big-data-is-watching-you-and-it-wants-your-vote/ [Accessed July 26, 
2018] 
  
definition of profiling which considers that to establish whether a processing activity27 can be 
deemed to monitor the behaviour of data subjects, it should determine whether  
“natural persons are tracked on the internet including potential subsequent use of 
personal data processing techniques which consist of profiling a natural person, 
particularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him or for analysing or 
predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes”. 28  
Regardless of whether the profiling of individuals to establish personality traits and political 
sympathies for micro-targeting does influence political views and real-world behaviour 
(voting), the intention is to do so, and this corrupts political communication.29 The use of half-
truths, bias, selective history and misleading information is not a new phenomenon. What is 
new is that these communications are much more precise, and “knowing”30 and as such raise 
questions about individual privacy, agency and, potentially, thought.31 Traditional 
advertising methods have been discarded because they are “incapable of affecting the type of 
mass opinion shifts necessary for social change”.32 As data analytics can extrapolate meaning 
from textual and semantic data such as social network feeds and emails to deduce individuals' 
opinions about current affairs, other people and events, a detailed and in-depth 
understanding can be gained.33 Some accounts suggest that digital strategy firms are 
deploying tests to detect emotional attachments and values to produce political messages 
engineered to maximise emotional and psychological impact.34 As Emotion Artificial 
Intelligence is developed this is possible and raises more concerns about how the law can 
preserve political agency.35 On the horizon lie technologies that can detect individuals’ 
emotional states through data surveillance and promote large-scale behaviour change 
                                                          
27 Processing is broadly defined by article 4(2) of the GDPR as any operations(s) performed on personal data or 
on sets of personal data, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment 
or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction. 
28 GDPR, recital 24. GDPR, art. 4(4) is its corresponding substantive provision. GDPR, art. 3(2)(b) brings the 
monitoring of behaviour within the territorial scope as far as that behaviour happens in the EU.  
29 B. Shiner, “Integrity instead of deceit: how to improve the delivery and content of political campaigns” (July 
18, 2018) LSE Brexit http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/07/18/the-delivery-and-content-of-political-campaign-
material/  [Accessed July 26, 2018] 
30 D. Beer, “Data-led politics: do analytics have the power that we are led to believe?” (March 3, 2017) LSE Blog 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-politics-of-data-led-campaigning/#Author [Accessed July 26, 2018] 
31 Castells argues that power relationships “are largely constructed in people’s minds through communication 
processes. The shaping of minds is a more decisive and lasting form of domination…”, see M. Castells 
Communication Power, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2013) xix; K. Yeung, "'Hypernudge': Big Data as a model of 
regulation by design" (2017) ICS 118; S. Alegre, "Rethinking freedom of thought for the 21st century" (2017) 
EHRLR 221 
32 A. Nix “From Mad Men to Math Men” (Online Marketing Rockstars Keynote, Hamburg, 10 March 2017) 
youtube.com https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bG5ps5KdDo [Accessed July 26, 2018] 
33 See fn. 17; B. Liu, “Sentiment analysis and opinion mining” (2012) Synthesis Lectures on Human Language 
Technologies 5(1) 1-167 
34 E. Briant interview with Brittany Kaiser “Explanatory essays giving context and analysis to submitted evidence” 
(April 16, 2018) https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-and-
sport/Dr%20Emma%20Briant%20Explanatory%20Essays.pdf 2 [Accessed July 26, 2018]  
35 L. Goasduff, “Emotion AI Will Personalize Interactions” (January 22, 2018) 
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/emotion-ai-will-personalize-interactions/ 
  
interventions through smart-phone prompts36 and can even read and respond to thoughts.37 
Experts warn that it will be increasingly possible to stage “attacks” based on the analysis of 
human behaviours, emotions, and beliefs based on available data.38 Technology already 
possesses the ability to manipulate information. Deep fakes are realistic (and often 
undetectable) digital manipulation of sound, images, or video to impersonate someone or 
make it appear that a person did something that they did not. The problem of foreign 
interference, as alleged in relation to the 2016 US presidential election and the 2016 UK-EU  
referendum, could worsen as technology becomes more sophisticated and can ‘distort reality’. 
The potential for social harm (not just from malign states) may further erode trust in 
information, distort democratic discourse, manipulate elections, erode confidence in 
significant public and private institutions all of which challenge stable and democratic 
governance.39 Combine that with the exponential increase in data sets40 and the growing 
sophistication of big data analytics, there are grounds for an “ethical pause”41 in the use of 
data in politics – but would a regulatory halt, or overhaul, be more appropriate? That another 
election or referendum campaign could run without the comprehensive root to branch 
reforms necessary is looking increasingly likely as suggested amendments to the system 
amount to a couple of tweaks that will not address the problems within the system as a whole.  
The applicable legal framework 
Data Protection  
During an unfolding scandal around the use of data for political purposes in the US 
presidential election and the UK-EU referendum both in 2016, Facebook revealed that 87 
million people had their profile information accessed by Cambridge Analytica, a data analyst 
and strategic communication firm.42 Data from these profiles, including private messages,43 
was used to refine micro-targeting and other covert political campaigning techniques.  
                                                          
36 N. Lathia, V. Pejovic, K. K. Rachuri, C. Mascolo, M. Musolesi and P. J. Rentfrow, “Smartphones for  Large-
scale Behavior Change interventions” (2013) IEEE Pervasive Computing 12(3) 66-73 
37 An MIT headset can read and transcribe thoughts (the internal voice) by measuring subtle neuromuscular signals 
that are triggered when a person verbalises internally. When someone says words inside his or her head, the device 
matches particular signals to particular words, feeding them into a computer with 92% translation success rate.  
38 Future of Humanity Institute, “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and 
Mitigation” (February 2018) arxiv.org https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1802/1802.07228.pdf [Accessed July 26, 
2018] 
39 R. Chesney and D.K. Citron, “Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National 
Security” (2018) SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954 [Accessed July 23, 2018]  
40 The Internet of Things will increase the amount of data. In 2017, there were 8.4 billion connected devices in 
use worldwide projected to increase to 30 billion by 2020, see Demos “The Future of Political Campaigning” 
(July 18, 2018) demos.co.uk https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-Future-of-Political-
Campaigning.pdf 2 [Accessed July 20, 2018] 
41 ICO “Democracy disrupted? Personal information and political influence” (July 10, 2018)  ico.org.uk 
https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf 11, 45 [Accessed July 12, 
2018]  
42 M. Schroepfer, “An Update on Our Plans to Restrict Data Access on Facebook” (Facebook, April 4, 2018)  
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/restricting-data-access/ [Accessed April 4, 2018]. In the wake of the 
scandal, Facebook altered its API settings to ensure third parties can no longer access Facebook user's data and 
violate user privacy.  
43 L. Kelion, “Facebook: Cambridge Analytica data had private messages” (April 10, 2018) BBC News 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43718175 [Accessed May 18, 2018] 
  
Investigations44 are determining to what extent individuals in the UK were micro-targeted 
based on deceitfully or covertly gathered data. It is not the specific technique of micro-
targeting that is unlawful rather the way in which the data is handled, who is it shared with 
and what data subjects are told, or not told, when they first grant access to their data. The ICO 
has investigated allegations of data misuse and have confirmed that social media platforms, 
data brokers and political campaign groups engaged in data misuse during the UK-EU 
referendum campaign. Furthermore, the ICO identified ongoing risks and concerns arising 
from the use of personal data by political parties specifically in relation to the purchasing of 
marketing lists and lifestyle information from data brokers without sufficient due diligence, a 
lack of fair processing, the use of third-party data analytics companies with insufficient checks 
around consent, and the provision of members contacts lists to social media companies. 
Indeed, eleven political parties were sent warning letters requiring action and Assessment 
Notices for audits by the ICO although regulatory action was also taken against Facebook and 
a data broker.45  
The GDPR, implemented by the Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018 which replaced the 1998 Act, 
does not have retrospective effect. As such the DPA 1998 applies to the allegations of misuse 
of personal data for political purposes that occurred before May 2018, when the GDPR came 
into direct effect. Profiling and the use of big data is not unlawful but requirements under the 
DPA 1998, and now the DPA 2018, must be met. There are two categories of data: personal 
data; and, sensitive personal data (which includes political opinions).46 There are also different 
uses of data in politics such as processing personal data for general promotional purposes and 
processing personal data to reveal political opinions for micro-targeting.47 To lawfully and 
fairly process both types of data, at least one of the general conditions set out in schedule 2 
DPA 1998 and now article 6 of the GDPR must be met. To process sensitive personal data at 
least one of the conditions previously set out in schedule 3 DPA 1998 and now article 9 GDPR 
and schedule 1 part 2 DPA 2018 must also be met.  
When determining whether personal data is processed fairly and lawfully, it must be 
considered whether any person from whom the data was obtained was deceived or misled as 
to the purpose(s) for which the data is to be processed.48 Fairness and transparency are 
fundamentally linked in the data protection regime. Unfairness can most starkly be seen when 
there is a disconnect between the initial cause for data collection or data provision and the 
subsequent use of that data. Individuals submit details online for various purposes, but the 
clincher is the deceptive retention and evaluation of personal information, including political 
views, for direct marketing.49 One particular technique used before the UK-EU referendum 
vote was the gathering up of data through smartphone applications which targeted the users’ 
                                                          
44 The ICO investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns is examining over 30 organisations 
and individuals 
45 See fn. 22 
46 The GDPR now refers to ‘special categories of data’ but this paper will refer to sensitive data to mean the same 
thing 
47 The difference between sensitive personal data processing (processing revealing political opinions) and 
processing for political purposes warrants further exploration but is outside the scope of this paper. 
48 Data Protection Principle 1 as per DPA 1998, s. 1(1), Pt 2, Sch. 1; GDPR art. 5(1)(a) 
49 Innovations (Mail Order) Ltd v Data Protection Registrar (DA92 21/49/1) 
  
contacts lists or Facebook friends’ accounts.50 Not only is this not transparent and unfair but 
the necessary consent for processing personal data is unlikely to be found because the consent 
is obtained from the user of the smartphone application rather than the people in their contacts 
list or their Facebook friends who remain unaware that their data is being accessed. 
Proactively, and in future, Data Protection Impact Assessments should highlight any potential 
privacy risks and points at which consent must be sought and notifications delivered. Another 
requirement is that data should be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes and be processed compatibly with those purposes only.51 To illustrate, the passing 
of personal data from an insurance company to a political group for political campaigning 
purposes is not in keeping with this requirement.52   
Personal data may be used for promotional purposes in order to campaign and effectively 
communicate ahead of an election or referendum. Section 8(e)53 provides a lawful basis for the 
processing of personal data “that is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest” including “an activity that supports or promotes democratic engagement” 
such as communicating with electors, campaigning activities, and opinion gathering inside 
and outside election periods.54 Although this basis will still be subject to the GDPR six data 
protection principles including lawful, fair and transparent processing, purpose minimisation 
and accountability, the ICO warned that there was no need for this additional and broad 
provision55 because the consent56 or the legitimate interests57 legal bases under article 6 GDPR 
are more appropriate justifications for processing personal data. The legitimate interest basis 
enables a balancing test between whether the legitimate interests are overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. This is an important test to 
ensure that organisations do not use a broad legal basis to legitimise opaque micro-targeting 
and the other campaigning techniques the ICO was investigating at the time section 8(e) was 
inserted into the Bill. During the ICO’s investigation, it was made clear that political parties 
and campaign groups pay private organisations to process data and the democratic 
engagement basis does not apply to them. Also, this basis does not get around the additional 
provisions applicable to sensitive personal data.  
Sensitive personal data may also be used for political promotional purposes but it cannot be 
processed unless one or more of the applicable conditions are met including that the data 
                                                          
50 See fn. 22; T. Peters, “Brexit? There was an app for that” (June 24, 2016) Medium.com 
https://medium.com/@uCampaignCEO/brexit-there-was-an-app-for-that-57d1d658b4f1 [Accessed July 30, 
2018] 
51 Data Protection Principle 2 as per DPA 1998, Pt 1, Sch. 1; GDPR art. 5(1)(b) 
52 See the ICO’s investigation of Leave.EU and Eldon Insurance Services Limited, fn. 22 
53 Recital 56 states that in relation to electoral activities, political parties may compile personal data on people's 
political opinions for processing provided that appropriate safeguards are established. 
54 DPA 2018 Explanatory notes, para 86 
55 Data Protection Bill, House of Commons Public Bill Committee: Information Commissioner’s further written 
evidence (March 19, 2018) ico.co.uk https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2258462/data-protection-
bill-public-bill-committee-ico-further-evidence.pdf [Accessed May 10, 2018] 
56 GDPR, art 6(1)(a) 
57 GDPR, art 6(1)(f) 
  
subject has given explicit consent;58 and, the processing is carried out by a registered59 person 
or organisation and is necessary for the purpose of that person’s or organisation’s “political 
activities”60 including campaigning, fund-raising, political surveys and case-work.61 
Although, the processing of sensitive personal data without consent is generally prohibited 
by the GDPR,62 as it is democratically desirable for political parties, campaign groups, 
candidates and elected representatives to communicate with the electorate the data protection 
regime establishes some circumstances in which processing of sensitive data can be allowed 
for reasons of public interest.63 Sensitive personal data may be processed, without consent, in 
limited circumstances by registered political candidates, political parties64 and by elected 
members,65 who are, by way of example, entitled to access the full electoral register and the 
marked register which identifies who has voted in previous elections and referendums.66 
Outside of these limited circumstances, consent becomes a necessary condition. However, the 
GDPR principles of purpose limitation; data minimisation; data accuracy; and lawfulness, 
transparency and fairness apply irrespective of the consent of the data subject. Consent under 
the GDPR is defined as  
 
“any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's 
wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies 
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her”.67  
The required conditions for consent are set out in four subsections to article 7 GDPR and 
contain specific provisions on: the data controller being able to demonstrate consent; the 
prominence and clarity of requests for consent in an easily accessible form; an easy right to 
withdraw consent at any time; and, freely given consent when a contract, including a service 
provision, is conditional on consent although not being necessary for the performance of that 
contract. Explicit consent, one of the conditions for lawful processing of sensitive personal 
data, cannot be implied and amounts to consent that was freely given; was specific and 
informed;68 there was a level of transparency about what type of data would be collected; it 
was clear what the data will be used for and who it will be shared with;69 and, details about 
how an individual may exercise their right to object or withdraw consent were provided.  
It is clear from the ICO investigation that third-parties have become privy to vast amounts of 
personal data for political purposes and as such there must be a lawful basis for the processing 
and the processing must rely on the one the additional conditions necessary for the processing 
of sensitive personal data. Although data can be lawfully bought from data brokers for 
                                                          
58 DPA 1998, Sch. 3; GDPR art. 9(2)(a) 
59 A person or organisation included in the register maintained under section 23 of the Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendums Act 2000 
60 The Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000, section 8 uses the term “legitimate 
political activities” and does not refer to necessity; DPA 2018, section 10 and section 22(1), Pt 2, Sch. 1 
61 DPA 2018, section 22(4), Pt 2, Sch. 1 
62 GDPR, art. 9 
63 GDPR, recital 56  
64 The Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000, s. 8 
65 The Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) (Elected Representatives) Order 2002, s. 3-4 
66 Representation of the People Regulations 2001 (as amended), reg. 47   
67 GDPR, art. 4(11) 
68 European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC art. 2(h) 
69 Also a requirement of privacy notices, see fn. 22 
  
secondary use, valid consent for the sharing of personal data with third-parties must be 
obtained. Under the GDPR those third-parties will not be able to rely on assurances that 
consent was validly obtained by the data broker and will have to exercise their own due 
diligence. 70 The ICO’s investigation into the use of data in politics found evidence of political 
parties purchasing datasets from data brokers that had not obtained valid consent for the data 
to be used for political purposes.71 The transfer of data to a political party or group, without 
the consent or knowledge of data subjects, gives rise to potential causes of action for misuse 
of personal information and for failure to lawfully and fairly process data and failure to obtain 
data only for specified and lawful purposes and be processed compatibly with those purposes. 
 
Although, the GDPR introduces a higher standard of consent to processing personal data72 
there remain issues around the process of giving consent. Consent for data collection is 
granted to data controllers, like Facebook or political parties, who pass it onto data processors 
such as data analytics companies, for secondary use. Consent is often on condition of the 
provision of services and cannot be withdrawn whilst still accessing those services. Therefore, 
even when consent is given, it may not be adequate to satisfy the freely given element of 
consent if the individual had no real choice about giving it, such as when having to agree with 
terms and conditions to set up a Facebook account. Before the GDPR came into force 
companies sent automated privacy policy emails to individuals seeking opt-in consent which 
in practice repeat or worsen the same consent problems that existed before the GDPR because 
explicitly consenting to terms and conditions free companies from certain requirements 
within the GDPR.  This is particularly problematic when company terms of service and 
privacy policies are thousands of words long, and consent is presented as ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
– a pushing tactic subjected to a legal challenge arising hours after the GDPR took effect.73 
Research has noted that since the GDPR came into force, Facebook, Google and Microsoft have 
resorted to using a series of techniques to discourage or nudge users away from setting more 
robust privacy settings which have the effect of users unwittingly accepting, through an 
“illusion of control”, more expansive privacy settings which enable intrusive data collection.74 
Due to the element of deception and manipulation, these techniques do not appear to be in 
accordance with GDPR data protection principles such as informed and freely given consent, 
data protection by design and data protection by default.  
Online campaign material 
Online campaigning engages data protection regulations, electoral law and regulations on 
direct marketing. Political parties and groups are investing in micro-targeting by channelling 
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significant portions of their campaign funding into data analytics and social media advertising 
to try and ensure they get the most votes. Smaller sections of undecided and persuadable 
voters are particularly valuable as they can swing the outcome of a vote. Political parties spent 
£3.2 million, of £40 million, on direct Facebook advertising during the 2017 general election, 
up from £1.2 million during the 2015 general election.75 During the UK-EU referendum, the 
Vote Leave campaign sent one billion digital advertisements during a ten-week campaign 
period, particularly before the closing dates to register for postal voting and the last ten days 
before the vote, accounting for 98 per cent of its budget.76 Although the Remain campaign had 
substantial political resources, the Leave campaigners were tactical in encouraging people to 
vote, so the exact influence of varying campaign tactics remains unclear.77  
Techniques that profile potential voters for targeting and the adoption of computerised 
databases containing personal data have been used in the UK at least since 2004. Ahead of the 
2005 general election, the Conservatives78 used the Voter Vault which combined demographic 
data with surveys from voters to create a model that identified people for targeting depending 
on: whether they lived in swing seats; they possessed 'conservative traits'; and, they did not 
vote Conservative in the previous election.79 This methodology has been intensified. During 
the UK-EU referendum both the official Leave and Remain campaigns used third-party 
campaigning platforms that match political parties’ databases with social media data. The 
Leave campaigns Voter Intention Collection System, and the Remain campaigns 
NationBuilder were able to assign each voter with scores based on how likely they were to 
vote and which way.80 Smart mobile phone applications used for campaigning during the UK-
EU referendum accessed the data of application users’ contacts81 to analyse the data of the 
non-consenting users’ data to assess their political sympathies before sending them messages 
crafted to speak to issues predicted to have been at the forefront of their minds when deciding 
how to vote.82  
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Social media exposes the rules on political advertising to be inconsistent and inadequate in 
meeting the stated aim of controlling political advertising. Paid political campaign 
advertisements are banned from television and radio broadcast, but party broadcasts are 
allowed because they are not classed as advertising.83 Political advertisements sent to 
individual voters on social media, however, are unregulated because all non-broadcasting 
political advertising was specifically excluded from regulatory oversight under the 
Communications Act 2003. Non-broadcast political advertising was subject to the Advertising 
Code which was underpinned by the principle that all advertisements should be legal, decent, 
honest and truthful, and prepared with a sense of responsibility to consumers and society.84  
Although, the Neill Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended that a code of best 
practice should apply to political advertising in the non-broadcast media,85 in 1999 the 
Committee of Advertising Practice (that writes the Advertising Code) excluded political 
advertising from regulatory oversight for fear that investigations, likely concluded after 
election results are announced, could create political instability; concerns around the 
application of article 10 ECHR; and, political disagreement.86 In 2004, the Electoral 
Commission considered a legal framework for political advertisements but cautioned that the 
argument for a statutory code on political advertising is “unsustainable” because such 
regulation would be inconsistent with other non-broadcasting advertising regulation and 
because of the protections afforded to free speech.87 Even a regulatory code was considered 
“inappropriate and impractical…given the often complex and subjective nature of political 
claims.”88 This anomaly means that an individual can complain about misleading claims on 
consumer and departmental89 advertisements but political advertisements complained of 
being misleading, harmful or offensive cannot be investigated. The idea of a Code of Conduct 
to establish minimum standards online has recently re-emerged in the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life review of intimidation in public life;90 the Constitution Society report 
on data and democracy;91 and, the ICO’s report on the use of data in politics.92  
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The practice of social media political advertising may be caught to a limited extent by section 
11(3) DPA 1998 which provides that direct marketing includes political communications 
directed to an individual.93 The political party or group commissioning the marketing must 
tell people at the point of collection how their data will be used. Even if information is publicly 
accessible as a result of steps taken by the data subject, this does not automatically mean that 
it can be reused for other (political) purposes without providing fair processing information.  
Political parties must provide privacy notices to individuals when data about them has been 
taken from publicly available sources if they intend to use that data.94 In addition, information 
that is not explicitly offered but revealed after analysis of public data is still personal data and 
as such the consent requirements apply. Political parties, however, have been operating on 
the incorrect assumption that inferred information is not personal data.95 The DPA 1998, 2018 
and the PECR 2003 prohibit direct marketing through automated telephone calls, fax, email, 
text messages and post, unless the receiver has given consent. No provision explicitly applies 
to social media direct marketing but the right to object to direct marketing applies.96 
The Facebook Custom Audience tool allows advertisers to target selected groups of people 
with specific advertisements for a fraction of the price of direct mail by methods such as 
uploading lists of email addresses, phone numbers and user IDs. When using the Custom 
Audience tool, political parties act as data controllers and should conform to the data 
processing principles which require transparency of the use of data97 although they are not 
required to include information about who is responsible for the production of the material 
because imprints are only required for printed election material.98 Under the GDPR it is also 
necessary to actively provide people with the information in an accessible way, meaning 
putting up a privacy notice on a website without informing individuals it is there will not be 
satisfactory. The GDPR imposes the need to keep records of consent and strengthens the need 
to notify data subjects of the collection and use of their personal data, the purpose of data 
processing and the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, the 
retention periods for that personal data, and who it will be shared with.99 This creates a more 
robust context for the right to object, which is an absolute right if processing is for direct 
marketing purposes which Facebook advertisements and other electronic mail are.100  
The core issue raised by this institutionalised form of political communication is much 
broader than political advertising requirements. This form of communication forces what 
necessarily must be a public political process into private and inscrutable spheres. The law’s 
aim of preserving the integrity of the election process through the regulation of certain 
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practices, like paid party political advertisements, is undermined by the ease in which such 
parties can pay for advertisements, and other material, to be shared online.101 That hundreds 
of varieties of the same advertisement can be monitored for effectiveness in real-time by 
sophisticated algorithms and software monitoring to identify the most successful messages in 
a constant iterative process to ensure maximum impact, raises new questions about how to 
preserve the electorate's ‘free mind'.102 Further, this fragmented form of tailored political 
communication erodes at the concept of open, public debate where policies, pledges and 
politicians are held accountable. Delivering separate messages to separate sections of the 
electorate, free from competing or opposing messages, means that contradictory or 
inconsistent promises can be made to different people and a full picture of political intentions 
and policy positions is harder to see and scrutinise. This, in turn, lends itself to delivering 
messages containing only what individual members of the electorate want to hear and 
facilitates information asymmetry. 
Reforming digital political communications  
In response to breaches in electoral law and data protection; the use of micro-targeting as a 
strategic political tool; and, the spread of ‘fake news’ (better described as disinformation),103 
there have been numerous inquiries, investigations and reports on how to reform the 
regulatory system and update the law. The current emphasis upon a few bad players 
(corporate and foreign interests) skews the narrative, for there would be no market for these 
techniques if politics did not invest in them. There is a general sense of alarm in public 
discourse around these practices,104 which is not unwarranted but, throughout history new 
technologies have disrupted traditional forms of social and political communication and the 
law and society have generally adapted. It remains important to examine these issues not only 
from a regulatory perspective but also a broad perspective. The more fundamental issues do 
not relate to closing regulatory gaps but ensuring the political ecosystem balances out more 
fairly and imbues democratic principles like fairness and transparency which can help future-
proof legal reforms. It seems that the scandal around data misuse for political purposes has 
served as an illustration of the huge distance between those elected to represent and those 
being represented - with companies exploiting that gulf for profit. Tweaking the regulatory 
system will not fix this problem. Focusing on whether, how or why the electorate is influenced 
misses the opportunity to think about how to make political communication more 
transparent, more honest, and more respectful of the electorate. Until we tackle this 
fundamental issue - whether through codes, regulations, or civil or criminal sanctions – the 
same campaign practices are likely to continue dominating the relationship the electorate has 
with its representatives. But, the likelihood of the Government, with no clear majority, 
introducing the required electoral reform legislation in this Parliament is slim. 
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Review of suggested reforms 
The Electoral Commission has recommended a legislative amendment using powers under 
s143(6) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to require imprints on 
digital campaign material so that individuals know the source of the material and it will assist 
the tracking of donations and spending.105 Thousands of political adverts, and other material 
like videos or memes, are disseminated online every day. How will this content be regulated 
to ensure political material conforms to the imprint requirement? Facebook will not readily 
accept this burden which may require expensive human moderators to make subjective and 
contextual judgements calls. Also, how will material that does not include an imprint be 
removed considering that it is not possible to delete all traces of a post, especially if it gets 
shared a lot? There are ways around the imprint requirement such as paying people to post 
messages of support as ordinary users or by relying on the organic spread of material on social 
media without paying for it. 
The Electoral Commission's other recommendations amount to a collection of modifications. 
It repeats a recommendation to amend schedule 8 of the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 which lists the requirements on spending returns to include a specific 
category of social media spending (currently reported as ‘advertising’ or ‘unsolicited material 
to voters’). It calls for more detailed and meaningful invoices for digital activity to close a 
loophole which enables the much higher national spending limit to be directed locally 
towards swing seats and key constituencies breaching the lower local spending limits.106 The 
Commission requested an increase in the fine it can sanction for breaching electoral law; 
executive clarification on foreign donations and campaign spending; social media action on 
paid-for political advertisements originating from outside the UK; and, an improvement on 
the rules and deadlines for reporting spending for scrutiny during or shortly after elections or 
referendums. The Commission proposed a social media online database of paid-for political 
adverts, which social media companies already said they would implement,107 instead of 
endorsing a more robust idea of creating a central public register of online political 
advertisements that would not be left to social media companies.108 Considering the rate of 
micro-targeted advertisements during the UK-EU referendum, there could be billions of 
advertisements registered.  
Modern election law109 continues to be founded upon practices such as intimidation, bribery, 
corruption or coercion that were rife in Britain until the introduction of several Acts of 
Parliament in the late 19th Century.110 Electoral offences are still framed in the language of the 
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19th century when votes were bought, elections rigged for favours, and the ballot could be 
coerced.111 Election law must reflect the reality of contemporary political campaigning, the 
behaviour of elected representatives, political candidates and parties as well as the way in 
which people can be coerced or manipulated, which is much more than physical intimidation. 
A wholesale review must go further than the Law Commissions’ 2016 recommendations for 
reform which prioritised unifying the pieces of electoral legislation, modernising procedures 
and processes and improving the way to challenge election outcomes.112 Although these are 
important reforms, a complete overhaul is needed to ensure electoral offences reflect the 21st 
century.  
The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s (DCMSC) proposed a ban on micro-
targeted political advertising through Facebook 'lookalike audiences' where users have 
requested not to receive political adverts, and a national minimum limit for the number of 
voters sent individual political messages. This was a compromise on the suggestion of a total 
ban.113 But, should digital political advertisements and micro-targeting be banned entirely? 
As explained in relation to imprints, there are ways around moderate or partial bans on 
political digital content and regulations can quickly become out of date. Yet, a ban could 
dampen down political engagement as people would be forced to return to traditional media 
when every other part of our life is becoming digitalised. The DCMSC also called for the 
Electoral Commission to establish a code for advertising through social media during election 
periods and consider whether social media campaigning should be restricted during the 
regulated period to registered political organisations or campaigns.114 This could work in 
tandem with the suggestion that social media companies and intermediaries work closely 
with regulators and advise political parties on transparency and accountability when using 
data to target voters on those platforms,115 and that social media companies improve their 
policies on campaign material and advertising for elections and referendums in the UK. Social 
media platforms are being urged to introduce transparency features with the ICO and the 
Electoral Commission being consulted on those features and completing evaluations.116 The 
DCMSC targets intermediaries and proposes a new category for technology companies which 
is neither platform or publisher, but something in between that establishes some liability to 
act against "harmful and illegal content".117 How intermediaries can monitor this while 
preserving freedom of speech and not enforcing rules unfairly or in a discriminatory way and 
whether such power should be delegated needs to be given much more consideration by the 
DCMSC.118 
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Facebook already engages in political narrative sharing, information control and emotional 
manipulation.119 A randomised controlled trial of political mobilisation messages delivered to 
61 million Facebook users during the 2010 US congressional elections showed that the 
Facebook messages “directly influenced political self-expression, information seeking and 
real-world voting behaviour of millions of people. The messages not only influenced the users 
who received them but also the users’ friends, and friends of friends”.120 Such digital 
interventions can be heralded as promoting democratic engagement, especially when 
perceived as being neutral or civic. However, the same techniques can be used to suppress 
democratic engagement or shape democratic discourse according to malign or corporate 
interests. Another example being Facebook's intervention in the campaign on the Irish 
referendum on the Eighth Amendment when, after public pressure, it blocked advertisements 
that originated from outside of Ireland. Google blocked all advertisements on its search engine 
and on YouTube that related to the referendum.121 Such an intervention is in the gift of 
intermediaries that at once recognise the influence of foreign advertisements by banning them 
whilst maintaining that although they are not publishers,122 they are responsible enough to 
make the right judgement calls as moderators. The potential for inconsistency grows if such 
action becomes the basis for a much broader range of online interventions. This action came 
late in the campaign cycle and was an unforeseen intervention disadvantaging some 
campaign groups because it disrupted campaign strategies. Interventions such as this should 
be predictable, consistent and transparent. Facebook has said it is developing tools to increase 
transparency in political advertisements which includes a verification process requiring 
advertisers to be resident in the country holding an election. However, it is straightforward to 
alter the location as recorded on a Facebook account or to change the IP address of the device 
being used to access Facebook or any other online platform.  
The ICO called on Government to develop a statutory Code of Practice for the use of personal 
information in political campaigns which will form part of a broader legislative vehicle and 
contain guidance. The ICO seeks to promote dialogue between the regulators and the 
Government, and encourages a comprehensive reflection on corporate and political 
practices.123 Hopefully, there will be meaningful engagement from the legislative although, 
elected representatives are captured by these techniques that help disseminate their message, 
and maximise their outreach and vote share. Whether politicians will willingly usher in 
effective limits of political micro-targeting, and other persuasive campaign techniques, is 
uncertain. From the perspective of the political establishment, the capacity to effectively 
persuade is critical to promoting their agenda and reaching out to voters in an increasingly 
polarised and fast-paced political ecosystem. For the sake of promoting the core principles of 
open debate, transparency, trust, respect, responsibility and fairness something needs to give. 
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Reform based only on commercial and individual wrongs neglects to fully embrace these 
principles and introduce them back into political communication with the electorate. Further, 
presenting Codes of Practice as a solution to the issue is problematic. Codes of Practice are 
generally non-binding, they cannot impose sanctions and there is no available remedy for 
breaching the Code of Practice. They are meant to explain the law while going further by 
laying out ‘good practice’. As Bob Watt argues, it would be “an unacceptable constitutional 
departure to allow private parties to agree a species of law between themselves” which Codes 
of Practice settled between political parties and overseen by the Electoral Commission (or any 
other regulator) would do.124 This may be even more concerning when Codes include 
agreements with corporate parties as well. As Watt states, a Code of Practice is of low value, 
as far as Codes differ from guidance, because “signing-up people not to break the law is 
nugatory because it is redundant”.125 Another deeper problem relates to the chilling effect of 
Codes that can discourage certain behaviours that are not unlawful but are ruled-out of ‘best 
practice’ codes.126 It is the law that must be obeyed and Codes cannot act as substitutes in the 
absence of laws.  
Conclusion  
It is certain is that a new approach to shaping political discourse and influencing democratic 
decision-making is emerging. The complex legal framework is characterised by overlapping, 
out-dated provisions and a failure to think wholesomely about protecting the democratic 
process in contemporary circumstances. Notwithstanding the gaps within the regulatory 
framework, caution should be exercised when deciding if and how to respond to the issues 
posed. Despite the anomaly of political advertising in the non-broadcast media, to avoid the 
danger of introducing restrictive codes or regulations that could affect democratic discourse, 
the extent to which political communication should be monitored and regulated must be 
carefully considered. In particular care must be exercised when delegating the judgement of 
what can and cannot be communicated online to corporate interests rather than independent 
regulators.   
The GDPR does introduce more data rights and restrictions on the use of personal data as well 
as proactive principles and requirements. The coincidence of the GDPR coming into force with 
the public attention given to the scandal of Cambridge Analytica, Facebook and political 
campaign groups (and by implication Government Ministers) has helped to increase public 
awareness of data privacy. It should be clearer to political parties, groups, elected 
representatives and technology companies what consent amounts to and the circumstances in 
which sensitive personal data can be processed. However, it remains unclear how the 
“democratic engagement” lawful basis for processing personal data contained in section 8(e) 
DPA 2018 will apply to future political campaigns. In any case the matter of consent plays a 
critical role in attempting to re-balance the relationship between data subjects and data 
controllers - as long as individuals are able to realise and act upon the misuse of their data. 
The requirement to notify data subjects of the intended use of their data should, in theory, 
encourage individuals to exercise their data rights. Article 80(2) GDPR provides any body, 
                                                          
124 R. A. Watt “Reflections on a New Structure for the United Kingdom’s Electoral Law: A Report prepared for 
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125 See fn. 124, para 3.8.10.7 
126 See fn. 124, para 3.8.10.8 
  
organisation or association the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority, 
independent of a data subject’s mandate, if data rights may have been infringed as a result of 
processing. Yet, section 187 DPA 2018 excludes article 80 and limits organisations or bodies to 
acting on behalf of data subjects only when data subjects have authorised them to do so. 
Article 80(2) GDPR, if incorporated into the DPA 2018 after the statutory review period (or 
sooner),127 would provide a much more effective mechanism for holding controllers to 
account, through lodging complaints and seeking judicial remedies and compensation, where 
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